@jpmens Very poor article (as always with McCarthy, the form trumps the content). 1) It never mentions the possibility of other DoH resolvers, outside of Cloudflare 2) It never mentions that DoH to the ISP resolver is pointless since the problem is pecisely the ISP's resolver behaviour.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens And your answer is very biased and somewhat dishonest:
* configuring an alternate resolver is something that will only be done by power users. Default config matters a lot.
* bypassing ISP resolvers was never the purpose of an encryption protocol. The goal is to protect data over the network from snooping and from alteration.

@x_cli @jpmens Yes, the default is very important (most users won't change it or wouldn't even dare to think about it). That's why the default must be towards security. If the ISP were to pledge solemnly to follow the principles of network neutrality and privacy, they would have a right to complain. But they don't. Quite the opposite.

Also, yes, the default choice is very important but most anti-DoH texts lie by claiming that Mozilla forces the use of CLoudflare. This is simply not true.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens I'll write during my winter holidays a piece on DoH and Mozilla's strategy that will illustrate, with some PoC, why Mozilla is putting us at risks, and why Cloudflare is also a very bad default choice. No politics. Tech-only.

@x_cli @jpmens Don't spend time convincing me that Cloudflare is bad, I know. (I use my own DoH resolver.) The question is about DoH, not about Cloudflare.


@bortzmeyer @jpmens Most sound people complain about Mozilla-Cloudflare partnership. Not about DoH itself, although there is a bit to say about it as a protocol as well.
I, for one, have no problem with Chrome strategy for DoH implementation and deployment. But I am a fierce opponent of Mozilla's strategy.

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@x_cli @jpmens So, nothing to do with DoH?

And I criticize the Mozilla strategy as well. Allowing ISP to disable security at will (via the canary domain) is a bad idea.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens DoH as a protocol is stupidly complicated from the network stack point of view (DNS over H1 over H2 over TLS over TCP (WTF?!!), and stupidly ignorant because it leverages almost none of the features of the underlying transport protocols.
Apart from that, it's peachy.

@x_cli @jpmens Then use DoT. But I suspect that the people who criticize DoH because it protects the user won't like DoT either.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens I personally prefer DNScrypt. But my preferences are uninteresting. The problem lies in Mozilla's strategy.

I would oppose them even if they were to use DNScrypt to talk to Cloudflare by default.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens Regarding Mozilla's kill-switch, I concur. This is totally brain-dead.

@bortzmeyer @jpmens

"As a side-note: we already deny RFC1918-addresses from DNS-over-HTTPS
responses so in that regard, using TRR will save you from these DNS attacks!"


So, I was wrong. DoH-to-Cloudflare-by-default is not an issue, as far as DNS rebinding is concerned. Sorry 😶😥

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