Step right up, spin the wheel and find out who is implementing bad password policies today!
Today's winner is Transamerica. Their website doesn't allow you to paste when changing your password, so using a password manager is that much more annoying.
Thank you, Transamerica. You are helping perpetuate the use of simple, short, memorable passwords for important financial information.
Listening to DefSec about Kaseya vulnerability...
My old job used Kaseya. It has port 5721/tcp open publicly for agents to check in. It also had a web interface, which is typically available publicly. We used 2FA, but it's still far too exposed.
And since Kaseya is an RMM tool, if you pop the controller, you own the endpoints. You'd think securing the controller would be more of a priority...
But what do I know. Customer security is secondary to administrative ease, apparently.
I received a LinkedIn request from a random Indian name person that has very few links and claims to have started at my place of employment just before I did. They are located several states away, but I work for a regional healthcare provider.
Seems fishy. Anyone seen things like this? And what's to be gained if it's not legit?
I've said it before, and apparently I'll say it again.
1. ...like onions.
2. ...all about risk management.
Good security has layers - a single edge firewall protects against one attack surface...and leaves the rest wide open. AV, host firewalls, etc, all layers that add to overall protection.
Which layers do you need? Depends on the risk your devices pose. Database of PII/PHI? Damn right you need all those layers. Dev box? Maybe not.
CVE-2018-16864 : exploitable since 2016
CVE-2018-16865 : exploitable since 2013
CVE-2018-16866 : exploitable since 2015 ( but fixed by mistake on 08/2018 )
- brick PC bugs ( EFI erase ) ✔️
- Many account of unbootable machines after an upgrade: ✔️
- Uncountable vulns since years ✔️
Seriously, what is gonna take for distro to finally put back systemdD(isaster) to the dump trash it belongs ??
Oh, and any linux distro lead willing to share the huge hush money they must have won to accept that utter shitty piece of trash in the first place ?
I don't see any other reasons now...
If your website has password complexity requirements...maybe you should actually TELL PEOPLE. Don't just fail and give a generic "Our site is broken" page.
I'm looking at you, GlobalKnowledge.
My randomly-generated password from my vault was no good, because (presumably) the special characters caused some kind of problem. Super-long alphanumeric was fine.
I fixed the insecure method of updating credentials I used in this blurb yesterday. Now it's basically a one-liner, and it's not writing passwords to files.
Wrote this little tidbit because I spent far too long looking through complicated scripts for what should be a simple task.
LAPS. Learn it. Deploy it. Be happy.
Does anyone have a good link for how certificates work? I come across a lot of people who think they're black magic. I want to be able to give them some info to explain it.
Any suggestions on links/resources/presentations would be appreciated.
I found this one that seems ok as a start: https://blogs.msdn.microsoft.com/freddyk/2017/02/06/ssl-certificates-101/
I saw a novel way to calculate the Nth *day of the month, I decided to make it a more generic function.
Can we all agree to focus more on RCEs than local-only exploits? That's not to say that local-only things don't need fixing, but let's focus on the bigger issues.
I'm sick of hearing about Spectre/Meltdown (and variants) being the end of the world. Let's fix them, but let's stop pretending they're the most critical issue out there.
Jack of all trades sysadmin (primarily Unix) with interest in security.
A Mastodon instance for info/cyber security-minded people.