LastPass attackers know your name and billing address and all websites you have saved passwords for, and if your master password isn't sufficiently strong may be possible to brute-force open everything on attacker's machines.


The fact LastPass doesn't encrypt website URLs is a known flaw it appears they never fixed on purpose, going back almost 6 years:

This eventual possible security breach was planned-for as part of LastPass' design for username and password protection. This doesn't break the core offering.
But it has stripped away multiple layers of protection and will hasten my looking at @bitwarden

It's impossible to be completely secure in a massive offering. However I have always disagreed with their decision to not 100% encrypt all metadata, and this event shows that was a foolish choice when seen against the inevitable of the entropy our complex electronic systems.

In the end, a password manager is still right choice in comparison to alternative. And a cloud-native offering like LastPass strongly hedges against data loss by normal users trying to manage their own vault. That is an undersold primary risk, not hackers. Still, very disappointed.

Current password setup:
- Primary vault is LastPass with 2FA
- Core fallback "key" accounts like email that allow pw reset are only in a KeyPass db file with 20char password, synced via OneDrive+2FA.
- This is then further backed-up with BackBlaze, using 40char encryption key

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